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Introduction and summary
Many countries worldwide have experienced serious
banking and/or currency (exchange rate or balance of
payments) problems in recent years with high costs
in terms of reduced income and increased unemploy-
ment to their own countries as well as others. A study
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported
that more than 130 of the IMFs 180-plus member
countries had experienced serious banking problems
between 1980 and 1995, and this was even before the
recent banking crises in East AsiaKorea, Thailand,
Malaysia, and Indonesiaas well as in Russia
(Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal, 1996).
A map of countries experiencing banking crises
is shown in figure 1. Lindgren et al. define serious
problems to include banking crises that involve bank
runs, collapses of financial firms, or massive govern-
ment intervention, as well as less damaging but
extensive unsoundness of institutions. With the pri-
mary exception of the U.K., the Benelux countries,1
and Switzerland, most of the countries that avoided
bank problems had no or nearly no modern banking
systems. Currency crises were even more frequent
than banking crises. They are typically defined as
historically large depreciations in exchange rates
and/or large declines in foreign reserves. Another
IMF study of 53 industrial and developing countries
identified 158 currency crises and only 54 banking
crises in approximately the same time period (IMF,
1998a). Many countries suffered more than one such
crisis during this period. A third study by Kaminsky
and Reinhart (1996 and 1999) of 20 countries from
1970 to 1995 identified 71 currency crises and 25
banking crises.
This article examines these twin banking and cur-
rency crises to attempt to identify their causes, partic-
ularly any similarities and interconnections, and their
implications both for the country in which they occur
and for other countries through possible contagion. Lastly,
the article evaluates the effectiveness of alternative
public policy initiatives introduced to mitigate if not
prevent these crises and their accompanying poten-
tially severe damage to the economy.
Not only have banking and currency crises been
frequent in number worldwide, but they have often
been extremely costly in terms of both declines in
real output and increases in transfer payments (wealth
transfers) from taxpayers to bank depositors and other
financial claimants whose funds were explicitly or
implicitly insured or guaranteed at par value by the
government. Thus, these crises are a major public
policy concern. The IMF estimated that cumulative
losses in gross domestic product (GDP) from potential
(trend) growth in the 158 recent currency crises in 53
countries averaged 4.3 percent of the trend GDP values
in each country and 7.1 percent in the 96 crises in
which any output losses were suffered (IMF, 1998a).
This is shown in table 1. The average time to return
to trend value was about one and a half years. The
output loss was greater in emerging economies than
in developed economies, although the crises lasted
somewhat longer in industrial than emerging economies.
The estimated cumulative output loss from potential
output in the 54 banking crises was significantly
greater than in the currency crises, averaging 11.6
percent in all crises and 14.2 percent in the 44 crises10 Economic Perspectives
that experienced an output loss. The loss was again
greater for emerging than industrial economies. More-
over, banking crises last 3.1 years on average, twice as
long as currency crises. In countries that experienced
both a banking and a currency crisis simultaneously,
the estimated output loss was greater than when each
crisis was experienced separately. The average cumu-
lative output loss was 14.4 percent in the 32 such crises
observed and this time was greater for industrial than
emerging economies.2 The average time for recovery
averaged about the same as for a banking crisis alone,
but increased sharply for industrial countries to nearly
six years.
The estimated transfer payments in support of
deposit guarantees in banking crises topped 10 percent
of GDP in a number of countries and exceeded 40
percent in Argentina, Thailand, Korea, Indonesia, and
Malaysia (table 2).3 The magnitude of comparable
transfer payments in currency crises from taxpayers
to protected domestic or foreign creditors, including
repayment of any loans from official international in-
stitutions, has not been estimated, but appears to have
been sizable in a number of recent crises. Both the
income loss and transfer payment estimates exclude
the costs to other countries that may either have been
adversely affected by the above problems or provided
assistance to the countries experiencing the problems.
The large magnitude of these numbers and the
fact that many of the crises occur concurrently across
countries and give rise to widespread fear of conta-
gion or systemic risk clearly indicate why banking
and currency crises attract the attention of bankers,
policymakers, and the general public worldwide. But
the causes, characteristics, dangers, and other features
of these crises are not often clearly delineated and
analyses of these problems frequently suffer from
vagueness. For example, while liquidity and solvency
problems at banks may be readily visualized and dif-
ferentiated, the idea of an illiquid or insolvent country
is more difficult to convey. However, a sharp depreci-
ation in exchange rates may trigger defaults by private
borrowers, including banks, and by sovereign govern-
ments on their foreign-currency-denominated debt
and even on their domestic currency debt, if the costs
of their foreign currency debt increase sufficiently.
Until recently, the explanation and analysis of banking
and currency crises were largely undertaken by differ-
ent researchers, many of whom were largely unaware
of or uninterested in each others contributions. This
occurred in part because, until recently, currency
crises were more balance of payments current (trade)
account than capital (financial) account crises and
the focus more of macroeconomists, while banking
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problems were primarily the domain of microecon-
omists. (Analyses of both types of crises include
Glick, 1999; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1996 and
1999; McKinnon and Pill, 1998; and Rogoff, 1999.)
Banking and currency breakdowns also tend to
be feared more than breakdowns in most other sectors
of the economy, because the public does not appear to
understand the operations of these sectors very well.
Both sectors deal in finance and intangibles, which
make them more difficult for the public to comprehend
than sectors that deal in tangibles, such as steel, auto-
mobiles, and even communications. As a result, for
many, these sectors are shrouded in mystery and lend
themselves readily to fictitious accounts of their op-
erations, particularly of the implications of problems
and breakdowns. Thus, for example, most of us are
more familiar and comfortable with the way firms
produce automobiles and what can go wrong than
with the way banks produce deposits and loans and
what can go wrong there. After all, one can always
kick the tires on an automobile, but it is harder to kick
the interest rate on a deposit or loan. To the extent that
the adverse implications of breakdowns are exagger-
ated, the resulting tales of horror are widely reported
in the press as facts and become the stuff that popular
novels and movies are made of, which further fan the
flames of fear. Thus, failures in the financial sector
lead to greater and stronger calls for government inter-
vention and remedies.
Triggering event
Crises have triggering events or shocks. A bank-
ing crisis is generally ignited either by the economic
(or legal) insolvency of one or more large banks or
similar financial institutions or by widespread depos-
itor runs on large banks or similar financial institutions
perceived to be insolvent and unable to repay their
deposits or other debt claims on time and at par value.
A currency crisis is generally started either by a sharp,
substantial, and disorderly decline in the exchange rate
in one country, frequently, although not always, from
levels set by a fixed (pegged) or crawling peg exchange
rate standard, or by a speculative run (attack) on a
countrys currency that exerts downward pressure on
TABLE 1
Costs of crises in lost output relative to trend
(197597)
Cumulative
Cumulative loss loss of output
Number Average of output Crisis with per crisis with
of crises recovery timea per crisisb output lossesc output lossd
(years) (% points) (percent) (% points)
Currency crises 158 1.6 4.3 61 7.1
Industrial 42 1.9 3.1 55 5.6
Emerging market 116 1.5 4.8 64 7.6
Currency crashese 55 2.0 7.1 71 10.1
Industrial 13 2.1 5.0 62 8.0
Emerging market 42 1.9 7.9 74 10.7
Banking crises 54 3.1 11.6 82 14.2
Industrial 12 4.1 10.2 67 15.0
Emerging market 42 2.8 12.1 86 14.0
Currency & banking crisesf 32 3.2 14.4 78 18.5
Industrial 6 5.8 17.6 100 17.6
Emerging market 26 2.6 13.6 73 18.8
aAverage amount of time until GDP growth returned to trend. Because GDP growth data are available for all
countries only on an annual basis, by construction the minimum recovery time was one year.
bCalculated by summing the differences between trend growth and output growth after the crisis began until
the time when annual output growth returned to its trend and by averaging over all crises.
cPercent of crises in which output was lower than trend after the crisis began.
dCalculated by summing the differences between trend growth and output growth after the crisis began until
the time when annual output growth returned to its trend and by averaging over all crises that had output losses.
eCurrency “crashes” are identified by crises where the currency component of the exchange market pressure
index accounts for 75 percent or more of the index when the index signals a crisis.
fIdentified when a banking crisis occurred within a year of a currency crisis.
Source: International Monetary Fund, 1999, World Economic Outlook: May 1998, p. 79.12 Economic Perspectives
the exchange rate (Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz,
1996).4 Thus, banking and currency crises both involve
an actual or potential depreciation in the value of finan-
cial claims. This reflects a failure by banks or countries
on a fixed or semi-fixed exchange rate to keep their
promise to redeem or exchange, respectively, claims
at a given rate (price). For banks and other privately
owned financial institutions, this results in insolvency
and either reorganization or liquidation. For countries,
although they survive, they are likely to experience
losses from higher foreign debt burdens and from
economic, political, and/or social turmoil and subse-
quent defaults and restructuring. (A broad spectrum
of views on the causes and triggering events of recent
banking and currency crises appears in Bisignano et
al., 2000, Hunter et al., 1999, and Summers, 2000.)
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) develop a broad set
of stylized facts (regularities) describing recent bank-
ing and currency crises.
Potential impact on the economy
The health of the banking and international sec-
tors is viewed to be important not only because these
sectors are perceived to be particularly vulnerable or
fragile, but because they are both economically impor-
tant and closely intertwined with other sectors in the
economy and, therefore, perceived to be likely to in-
fect other sectors with their problems (Davis, 1995).
A relatively small individual problem may be turned
into a much larger and broader crisis. Bank liabilities
comprise the major form of money in developed
economies and nearly everyone in such economies
touches and is touched by money and credit in their
everyday life. The insolvency or near insolvency of
one or more important banks is believed to reduce
credit, particularly loans, to the market or markets
served, ignite depositor runs either to other safe
banks or to riskless Treasury securities and currency,
reduce deposits and the money supply, disrupt the
operation of the payment system, increase uncertainty,
disturb financial markets, and cause, at a minimum,
fire-sale losses that will drop security prices below
their otherwise equilibrium levels. Such effects endan-
ger the solvency of other economically solvent banks
and could ignite further runs (Council of Economic
Advisers, 1999). These adverse effects are magnified
if the insolvent banks are physically closed or deposits
frozen for a significant length of time, so that some
or all depositors do not have immediate access to
some or all of their funds. Dermine (1996, p. 680)
has noted that
The issue is not so much the fear of a domino
effect whereby the failure of a large bank
would create the failure of many smaller
ones; strict analysis of counterparty expo-
sures has reduced substantially the risk of a
domino effect. The fear is rather that the need
to close a bank for several months to value
its illiquid assets would freeze a large part of
deposits and savings, causing a significant
negative effect on national consumption.
This does not happen in the U.S. today. With
rare exceptions, insured depositors at failed banks
have access to the full value of their funds the next
business day and uninsured depositors to the estimated
recovery value of their claim the next business day
through an advance by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) serving as receiver (Benston
and Kaufman, 1998, and Kaufman and Seelig, 2000).
However, this is not true in many other countries,
where uninsured depositors may have to wait long
periods of time until the appointed receiver actually
recovers the funds through the liquidation of the
TABLE 2
Estimated transfer cost of selected
banking crises
Estimated cost/
Country Period GDP (percent)






















Note: Includes all depository institutions; costs are to
governments and depositors.
Sources: Caprio and Klingebiel, 1999, Lindgren, Garcia,
and Saal, 1996, Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod, 1996, Wall
Street Journal, October 22, 1998, and July 27, 1999, and
Standard and Poor’s, various years.13 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
banks assets, and even insured depositors at failed
institutions may have to wait some time to regain
access to the full value of their deposits. In either case,
if depositors or other stakeholders suffer losses, the
adverse effects of problems at a single bank or small
group of banks could be transmitted quickly through-
out the banking sector, beyond to the entire financial
sector, and possibly even beyond to the macroeconomy,
causing sharp and abrupt declines or aggravating
already extant declines in aggregate output (Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 1999). At the same
time, asset prices, particularly in real estate and stock
markets, are likely to decline sharply. Not infrequently
these prices had previously been bid up sharply with
financing provided in large measure by rapid bank
credit expansion permitted if not fostered by the
central bank.
It is the suddenness of the transmission of shocks
as well as the breadth of the potential impact that
appears to differentiate the financial sector from most
other sectors as a cause of crises. As former president
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Gerald
Corrigan (1991, p. 3), has noted: More than anything
else, it is the systemic risk phenomenon with banking
and financial institutions that makes them different
from gas stations and furniture stores. Indeed, there
appears to be little fear of contagion and systemic risk
in most other, nonfinancial sectors of more or less
equal importance, such as automobiles, computers,
transportation, and even agriculture (food).
Banking problems may also ignite currency prob-
lems, particularly in smaller, open economies on fixed
or semi-fixed exchange rate standards. If the banking
and any accompanying macroeconomic and asset price
bubble problems are sufficiently severe, domestic and
foreign depositors at insolvent or near-insolvent banks
are likely to shift their deposits to perceived safer banks,
including foreign-owned domestically or nondomes-
tically domiciled banks, possibly in foreign-currency-
denominated deposits. This is particularly likely if, as
the problem increases in magnitude, doubts arise about
the governments ability or commitment to maintain
full deposit guarantees. At the same time, other do-
mestic and foreign investors are likely to shift their
funds abroad, again partially or totally in foreign cur-
rency. Such capital outflows (runs) exert downward
pressure on the countrys exchange rate. If the country
attempts to protect its exchange rate by selling its for-
eign reserves, aggregate bank reserves are reduced
by a like amount. Unless offset by increases through
other central bank operations, those sales intensify the
banking and macroeconomic problems by forcing fur-
ther bank asset sales and monetary contraction and
encouraging further capital outflows. This makes it
more difficult for the country to avoid a currency
depreciation.
Currency crises characterized by a sharp depre-
ciation in exchange rates are likely to increase both
the burden of debt denominated in foreign currency
to domestic borrowers and the probability of default
on such debt. The former will reduce the profitability
of domestic debtor firms and even threaten their sol-
vency. The latter is likely to reduce capital inflows,
particularly in the short run. Both effects will exert
downward pressure on aggregate income. Likewise,
a sharp depreciation in the currency of one country
relative to its trading partners will increase the price
of its imports and thereby also, at least in the short
run, its rate of inflation. The volume of imports is
likely to decline. In time, the lower exchange rate will
stimulate increased exports. These effects are likely
to reduce the exports both of the countrys trading
partners and of its export competitors to third countries
and may set off one or more rounds of competitive
depreciation (beggar-thy-neighbor responses), possibly
accompanied by increased trade and capital barriers.
If so, aggregate incomes in all affected countries will
be reduced.
Just as banking problems can ignite currency
problems, currency problems can ignite banking
problems. If a country experiencing a speculative run
on its currency attempts to protect its exchange rate
from depreciation by selling foreign currency, the
resulting reduction in its international reserves will
reduce bank reserves and, unless offset (sterilized)
by the central bank, ignite a multiple contraction in
money and credit that could threaten the solvency
of banks. Concurrently, to avoid, or at least delay,
a depreciation from a speculative run, countries fre-
quently increase their rates of interest to discourage
additional capital outflows and attract capital inflows.
But the higher rates may dampen domestic economic
activity, increase loan defaults, and threaten bank
solvency. Speculative runs on a currency also are
likely to include runs from domestic currency deposits
to foreign currency deposits, possibly even at the
same banks. This is a run on domestic currency, not
on banks, but in time may invite a run on banks. If a
country does not prevent a depreciation and if accom-
panying declines in aggregate income are sufficiently
large, loan defaults are likely to increase and could
drive some banks into or near to insolvency. Loan
defaults are likely to be more frequent and larger if
banks and/or bank customers had borrowed in foreign
currencies on an unhedged basis and were forced by
the depreciation to make larger domestic currency
payments than expected. Thus, even banks that fully14 Economic Perspectives
hedge their foreign currency borrowing by foreign
currency loans to domestic borrowers are likely to
suffer defaults when the domestic currency depreciates
significantly. The borrowers exchange rate risk becomes
the banks credit risk.
Thus, currency and banking crises are mutually
reinforcing, particularly under fixed or semi-fixed
exchange rates. However, Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1996) report that, while banking crises statistically
predicted balance of payments crises in the countries
they studied, balance of payments crises did not pre-
dict banking crises. That is, they find that, although
often happening concurrently, banking crises have
been an important cause of currency crises far more
often than the other way around.
Systemic risk
What makes banking and currency crises different
from most other crises and particularly frightening to
many people are the accompanying cries of conta-
gion or systemic risk. Systemic risk refers to the risk
or probability of breakdowns (losses) in an entire
system as opposed to breakdowns in individual parts
or components and is evidenced by comovements
(correlation) among most or all the parts. Thus, sys-
temic risk in banking is evidenced by a high correla-
tion and clustering of bank failures in a country, a
number of countries, or globally; and in currencies,
by a clustering of deprecations in exchange rates in
a number of countries. Systemic risk may also occur
in other parts of the financial sector, for example, in
securities markets as evidenced by simultaneous de-
clines in the prices of a large number of securities in
one or more markets in a country or across countries.
Systemic risk may be either or both domestic and/or
transnational.
Although systemic risk is frequently proclaimed
during banking and currency crises, its meaning is
ambiguous. It means different things to different peo-
ple, particularly with respect to causation. One popu-
lar definition refers to a big shock that produces
near simultaneous adverse effects for most or all of
the domestic economy or system. That is, systemic
refers to an event having effects on the entire banking,
financial, or economic system, rather than just one or
a few institutions (Bartholomew and Whalen, 1995,
p. 4). Likewise, Mishkin (1995, p. 32) defines systemic
risk as the likelihood of a sudden, usually unexpected,
event that disrupts information in financial markets,
making them unable to effectively channel funds to
those parties with the most productive investment op-
portunities. How the transmission occurs is unclear.
Other definitions focus on potential spillover
to others. For example, the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) defines systemic risk as the risk
that the failure of a participant to meet its contractual
obligations may in turn cause other participants to
default with a chain reaction leading to broader finan-
cial difficulties (BIS, 1994, p. 177). This definition
emphasizes causation as well as correlation (correla-
tion with causation) and requires strong direct inter-
connections or linkages among the institutions, markets,
sectors, or countries involved, so that when the first
domino falls, it falls on others, causing them to fall
and, in turn, to knock down others in a chain or
knock-on reaction. For banks, this may occur if,
for whatever reason, bank A defaults on a loan, de-
posit, or other payment to bank B that produces a
loss greater than Bs capital and forces it to default
on a payment to bank C with losses that are larger
than Cs capital, and so on down the chain (Crockett,
1997). The smaller a banks capitalasset ratio, the
more leveraged it is and the more it is likely to be
driven into insolvency by insolvencies of banks located
earlier on the transmission chain and to transmit losses
to banks located later on the chain.
For countries, this may occur through direct trade
linkages so that if country A experiences problems or
a depreciation in its exchange rate that reduce its im-
ports from country B, it causes Bs aggregate income
to decline, reducing its imports from country C, and
so on down the chain. What makes direct causation
(chain reaction) systemic risk in financial sectors partic-
ularly frightening to many is both the lightning speed
with which it is believed to occur and the perception
that it can infect innocent as well as guilty parties,
so that there is little or no protection against its dam-
aging effects.
A third definition of systemic risk also focuses
on spillover, but does not involve direct causation
and requires weaker interconnections. Rather, it
emphasizes similarities in third-party risk exposures
among the units involved. When one unit experiences
an adverse shock that generates severe losses, uncer-
tainty is created about the values of other units poten-
tially subject to the same shock. To minimize additional
losses, market participants will examine other units
(for example, banks or countries) in which they have
economic interests to see whether they are at risk. The
more similar the risk exposure profile with that of the
initial unit economically (in terms of macroeconomic
behavior, markets, or institutions), politically, or other-
wise, the greater is the probability of loss and the more
likely are the participants to withdraw funds as soon as
possible and possibly induce liquidity and even more
fundamental problems. This is referred to as a com-
mon shock effect and represents correlation without
direct causation (indirect causation).15 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Because information on either the causes or
magnitude of the initial shock or on the risk exposures
of the other units potentially at risk is not generally
available immediately, accurately, or free, and analysis
of the information is not immediate or free, participants
require time and resources to sort out the identities of
the other units at risk and the magnitudes of any poten-
tial losses. As credit markets deteriorate, the quality of
private and public information also deteriorates and
uncertainty increases further. Moreover, because many
of the participants are risk averse, they will transfer
funds, at least temporarily during the period of con-
fusion and sorting out, as quickly as possible to well-
recognized safe or at least safer units without waiting
for the final analysis. In periods of great uncertainty
and stress, market participants increasingly tend to
make their portfolio adjustments in quantities (runs)
rather than in prices (interest rates). That is, at least
temporarily, they will not lend at any rate, Thus, there
is likely to be an immediate flight or run to quality
away from units that appear potentially at risk, regard-
less of whether further analysis would identify them
ex post as having similar exposures that actually put
them at risk (guilty) or not (innocent). At this stage,
common shock contagion appears random, potentially
affecting more or less the entire universe and reflecting
a general loss of confidence in all units. Moreover,
because these runs are concurrent and widespread,
such behavior by investors is often referred to as
herding behavior.
The runs are likely to exert strong downward
pressure on the prices (upward pressures on interest
rates) of the securities of affected institutions and coun-
tries. At the same time, many of the affected countries
are likely to force their interest rates up even further to
reduce additional capital outflows and encourage
inflows. Thus, liquidity problems are likely to tem-
porarily spill over to units not directly affected by the
initial external shock. At some later date, after the
sorting out process is complete, some or all of these
flows affecting innocent banks or countries may be
reversed. During the sorting out period, the fire-sale
driven changes in both financial quantities (flows)
and prices (interest rates) are likely to overshoot their
ultimate equilibrium levels and intensify the liquidity
problems, particularly for more vulnerable units
(Kaminsky and Schmukler, 1999).
A distinction is often made between rational or
information-based systemic risk and irrational, non-
information-based, random, or pure contagious
systemic risk (Kaufman, 1994, and Kaminsky and
Reinhart, 1998). Rational or informed contagion as-
sumes that investors (depositors) can differentiate
among parties on the basis of their fundamentals.
Random contagion, based on actions by uninformed
agents, is viewed as more frightening and dangerous
as it does not differentiate among parties, impacting
innocent as well as guilty parties, and is therefore
likely to be both broader and more difficult to contain.
It is likely that innocent parties may be impacted
immediately during the sorting out period under com-
mon shock contagious systemic risk, but in time will
be sorted out by investors and depositors from guilty
parties. Thus, the empirical borderline between rational
and irrational contagion is fuzzy and in part depends on
the time horizon applied. Likewise, definitions of
innocent and guilty are not always clear and pre-
cise. Innocent parties may be defined as units that are
widely perceived to be economically well behaved.
That is, banks that are perceived to be solvent and
not overly leveraged and countries that are perceived
to have high foreign reserves relative to their foreign
liabilities and to be following sound monetary and
fiscal macroeconomic policies. Guilty parties then
are insolvent, near-insolvent, or excessively leveraged
banks and countries with low reserves or poor finan-
cial management.
The importance of the distinction between inno-
cent and guilty parties for evaluating contagious sys-
temic risk underlies the recent argument by the U.S.
Council of Economic Advisers that international
assistance should be offered to those cases where
problems stem more from contagion than from poor
policies, ... [that is,] countries with sound economic
policies may be subject to attack because of contagion
(Council of Economic Advisers, 1999, p. 285). It is
largely the perceived randomness of the contagion
that appears to make it more frightening in banking
and exchange rates than elsewhere and justifies spe-
cial protective public policy actions.
Recent changes in environment
It may be argued that contagious systemic risk
has become both more likely and more important in
recent years as a result of both 1) economic develop-
ment that increases the importance and interdepen-
dence of banking and the global interdependence of
countries, and 2) advances in computer and telecom-
munications technology that permit funds to be trans-
ferred more easily, quickly, and cheaply across large
distances and national boundaries and connect both
banks and countries more closely. At the same time,
financial liberalization and deregulation of both bank
activities and international capital controls have per-
mitted vastly increased national and transnational
capital flows to occur and participants to increase
their risk exposures. Gross international capital flows
through both banks and security markets have increased16 Economic Perspectives
almost twentyfold since the 1970s from about $50
billion annually to nearly $1,000 billion (Eichengreen
et al., 1998). Nevertheless, net international capital
flows, as measured by the negative of the net current
account, relative to GDP are still below the levels
reached under the gold standard and those of the
1920s. For example, Bordo, Eichengreen, and Kim
(1998) report that this ratio peaked at 6 percent for
12 major countries in the late 1910s, declined to 1
percent in the 1960s, and recovered only to 2 percent
by 1990. (See also Folkerts-Landau et al., 1997, and
Goodhart and Delargy, 1998.)
Through time, as income and wealth have in-
creased, many more economic units have been brought
into contact with banks and other financial institutions
and markets. Thus, disturbances in the banking and
financial sectors are likely to impact a larger proportion
of the population than in earlier periods. One could
ask how many individuals were affected directly or
even indirectly by the Tulip Bulb Bubble in Holland
in the 1630s or the South Sea Bubble in England in
1720. It is unlikely to have been very many, either in
absolute numbers or as a percentage of the popula-
tion, particularly relative to the numbers affected by
more recent financial crises.5
Advances in technology have made bank and
currency runs both easier and faster. Large depositors
and other banks can withdraw funds almost instanta-
neously. Even small depositors no longer need to line
up physically at banks to withdraw their funds. They
can transfer their funds to other banks by telephone
and computer and obtain, at least temporarily, cur-
rency at ATMs (automated teller machines). Silent
electronic runs now dominate noisy paper runs.
Not only can funds be withdrawn faster and more
cheaply, but runs can start faster upon receipt of any
adverse news about the financial health of institutions
and countries.
Trading activity for financial assets, including
both futures and options as well as cash securities and
trading by the banks for their own accounts, has in-
creased sharply and has vastly increased the volume of
interbank clearings. The notional value of derivative
contracts has increased nearly ninefold from $8 tril-
lion in 1991 to near $70 trillion in 1999. Spot and
forward currency transactions increased from $600
billion per day in 1989 to $1,500 billion per day in
1998 (Bank for International Settlements, 1998b). To
the extent that interbank claims are not settled imme-
diately on a gross basis with good funds (payment
versus payment or delivery), risk exposures have
increased both domestically and internationally. In
addition, the volatility of capital flows from the ability
of participants to change the directions and reverse
their investments almost immediately has increased.
Thus, for example, external bank and securities lend-
ing to the largely sick East Asian countries dropped
abruptly from $23 billion in the second quarter of
1997 to an outflow of about the same magnitude in
the fourth quarter and $35 billion in the first quarter
of 1998 (figure 2). The reversal in private capital
flows was even greater, as part of the decline in 1997
FIGURE 2
International bank and securities financing in Asia and Latin America
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aExcluding Hong Kong, Japan, and Singapore
Notes: Bank borrowing is measured by exchange rate adjusted changes in BIS reporting banks’ claims vis-à-vis
Asian and Latin American countries. Securities issuance is net of international money market instruments,
bonds, and notes. Data on bank borrowings were not available for the third quarter of 1998 at the time the
source report was published.
Source: Bank for International Settlements, 1998, International Banking and Financial Market Developments,
Basel, Switzerland, p. 10.17 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
and 1998 was offset by increased official flows from
international institutions and individual countries
(Haldane, 1999). Net private inflows into these coun-
tries totaled $103 billion in 1996 and dropped to near
zero in 1997 and to an outflow of $28 billion in 1998
(Council of Economic Advisers, 1999). The reversals
in net private capital flows may also be large relative
to a countrys GDP. For example, recent reversals in
flows were equal to 18 percent of Mexicos GDP in
198183 and 12 percent in 199395, 15 percent of
Thailands GDP in 199697, 11 percent of Venezuelas
GDP in 198790, and 9 percent of Koreas GDP in
199697 (Lopez-Mejia, 1999).
It is sometimes argued that financial liberaliza-
tion and deregulation effectively were responsible for
the increases in both the frequency and seriousness of
banking and currency crises in recent years. On the
surface, there appears to be some truth to this. Capital
flows to developing countries increased sharply fol-
lowing the liberalization of capital controls by these
countries (Folkerts-Landau et al., 1997, and Little
and Olivei, 1999). In addition, a number of studies
have reported that most recent banking and currency
crises occurred after financial deregulation or liberal-
ization. For example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996)
report that some 70 percent of banking crises were
preceded by deregulation and that financial liberaliza-
tion was statistically significant in explaining banking
crises, although not currency crises. By permitting
increased competition and reducing protection for
existing institutions, financial deregulation may be
expected to increase the number of bank failures.
Liberalization of capital controls sharply increased
capital inflows in many countries that could reverse
just as sharply and ignite pressures for depreciation.
But, more importantly, the liberalization and deregu-
lation were poorly implemented and sequenced in
most countries that experienced crises, rather than
being inappropriate and unnecessary. (Surveys of re-
cent cross-country financial liberalization experienc-
es appear in Williamson and Mahar, 1998, and
Eichengreen et al., 1998. Also see Gruben, Koo, and
Moore, 1999.)
Particularly for banking, the deregulation was gen-
erally introduced to correct serious extant problems in
the industry that had resulted in widespread and mas-
sive silent insolvencies and severe misallocations of
resources from excessive government regulation and
credit controls. When deregulation was finally imple-
mented, it was often only after the problems had
already been accumulating in size for some time, but
the losses were unbooked and not yet widely recog-
nized by the public. Thus, when the losses could no
longer be concealed and exploded into public aware-
ness, they were often incorrectly but understandably
associated in the publics eye with the concurrent
visible deregulation rather than with the earlier and
less visible fundamental causes. But, as is argued later,
by increasing risk, the government guarantees and
credit controls that accompany most forms of govern-
ment regulation frequently increased the probability of
insolvency. Moreover, once insolvent, the banks were
likely to be permitted to continue to operate and gen-
erate additional losses rather than being resolved. As
a result, the magnitude, although possibly not the
frequency, of banking insolvencies is likely to be
greater than before the introduction of these guaran-
tees. The deposits financing the negative net worth
of the insolvent banks are effectively off-balance-sheet
government debt and liabilities of the taxpayer. At
some point, the combined cost of the increased burden
on taxpayers and the lost efficiency and output from
the misallocation of resources increases sufficiently
to cause government regulation to lose support and
be increasingly replaced by market regulation. Like-
wise for liberalization of capital flows; the cost of
misallocation of resources from capital controls that
directed foreign credit and the loss of potential in-
creases in income from greater capital flows generate
pressures for change.
But market discipline does not work in a vacuum.
To be effective and superior to government regulation,
market regulation requires a number of institutional
preconditions. For banking, market regulation requires
a system of laws and property rights, particularly re-
garding contract enforcement, bankruptcy and repos-
session, incentives that reward success and punish
failure, well-trained and knowledgeable bankers and
bank supervisors, and relatively stable macroeconomic
conditions. These conditions are particularly impor-
tant because, with only rare if any exceptions, gov-
ernments appear unable to avoid providing at least
some explicit or implicit guarantees and downside pro-
tection for bank depositors, other creditors, and occa-
sionally even shareholders. Some parties, at minimum
shareholders, must be at risk and permitted to share
in any government losses to encourage the correct
risk incentives and to avoid privatizing only bank
profits and socializing the losses. Market discipline
must be permitted to increase to offset the decline in
regulatory discipline. For transnational capital flows,
basically the same preconditions are required.
In many if not most instances in recent years, de-
regulation and liberalization were introduced before
the preconditions were in place (McKinnon, 1993). In
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discipline, the outcome is often increased risk taking
with resulting large losses and disruptions that are
widely considered, incorrectly, the result of the dereg-
ulation and liberalization per se. Indeed, the transition
from government regulation to market regulation is
often a dangerous road that is full of potholes and
steep drop-offs that, if not navigated carefully, can
damage the process if not derail it altogether. If the
appropriate prerequisites are not in place at every
step of the deregulation process, the result may be
worse than the starting point. That is, deregulation
wrongly done may be more damaging to the economy
than the government regulation that it was intended to
replace. If, as is usual, deregulation and liberalization
are introduced after many years of government con-
trol and repression, they are likely to expose the extant
economic insolvency of banks and the overvaluation
of the countrys currency. As a result, until the adjust-
ment is complete, banking failures could increase
further and capital inflows could increase to unsus-
tainable levels that magnify the likelihood of abrupt
and disruptive reversals (McKinnon and Pill, 1996).
As is often the case in economics, many of the problems
lie in the transition from one equilibrium to another.
A study of 53 countries from 1980 to 1995 by
Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) finds that
financial liberalization increases the likelihood of
banking crises, but that the probability decreases the
stronger in place are the institutional preconditions
for liberalization and market discipline in terms of
contract enforcement, lack of corruption and bureau-
cratic interference, and respect for the rule of law.
Moreover, the more repressed is the financial sector
at the time liberalization is introduced, the more do
gains from liberalization outweigh the costs of any
banking crises.
Corrective policies (solutions) and
associated problems
What lessons may be derived from our analysis
of the large number of banking and currency crises
worldwide in recent years? Unfortunately, the major
lesson appears to be that there are no silver bullets
or easy answers to either preventing such crises or
solving them quickly at no or low cost after they
have developed. Although countries experiencing
either or both crises have many similarities and the
guilty parties can generally be identified after the
event, nearly all crises differ in significant ways and
the guilty parties are often difficult if not impossible
to finger ahead of time. Nevertheless, some conclusions
with respect to potentially corrective public policies
appear warranted.
Because systemic risk in banking and finance is
widely perceived to be destructive to the aggregate
economy, governments have almost throughout history
introduced a wide array of public policies intended to
reduce the frequency and magnitude of its impact.
Indeed, Corrigan (1991, p. 3) has argued that it is sys-
temic risk more than any other factorthat constitutes
the fundamental rationale for the safety net arrange-
ments that have evolved in this (U.S.) and other coun-
tries. Because the seriousness of systemic risk is often
judged by whether it is information based and impacts
only guilty parties or is irrational and nets innocent par-
ties as well, different policy strategies may be appropri-
ate to each type of systemic risk.
If contagious systemic risk is assumed to be in-
formation based and affects only guilty parties, then
solutions should focus both on strengthening each
partys abilities to absorb adverse external shocks,
that is, reducing their vulnerability, and on reducing
the magnitude and frequency of any such shocks
through appropriate macroeconomic policies. In the
absence of government intervention, the market
place will determine the optimal vulnerability of
each party. If deposit or currency values depreciate,
losses would be suffered by shareholders, depositors,
and other creditors in the case of bank failures and
possibly by a broader range of participants in the case
of exchange rate depreciations. But it is precisely the
fear of such losses that encourages participants to
protect themselves by reducing their vulnerability.
The long-term economic benefits of governments re-
peatedly compensating guilty parties ex post for actual
losses or ex ante guaranteeing (insuring) them against
potential losses from bank insolvencies or currency
depreciations appears, at best, highly questionable.
However, this does not rule out government actions
to prevent or offset temporary overshooting of price
and quantity adjustments, which frequently occur
during the information gathering and processing seg-
ments of the sorting out period, through lender of last
resort type activities. But the new, post-shock price
equilibrium and the extent of overshooting are both
difficult to define, and governments at times may un-
wisely attempt to restore the old pre-shock equilibrium
price structure with unfortunate consequences.
If, however, the systemic risk affects both guilty
and innocent parties, then a stronger although not air-
tight case can be made for providing, at least, tempo-
rary liquidity assistance to harmed but perceived
economically solvent parties to tide them over until
the market has recognized their innocence and both
prices and flows have adjusted accordingly. But, an
analysis of the historical record suggests both that
the market can generally differentiate innnocent from19 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
guilty parties and that there is little evidence of severe
and lasting damage to innocent parties in either com-
mon shock or causation contagious systemic risk, even
in the period before government intervention.6 More-
over, it often appears difficult for governments to dif-
ferentiate between guilty and innocent parties and, at
least, recent history suggests that governments have
frequently tended to define innocence rather broadly
and often provided assistance to insolvent parties.
This tends to delay the adjustment process and in-
crease aggregate costs to the economy. For U.S.
banks, particularly in the period before the Federal
Reserve System, monitoring of their interbank expo-
sures appears to have been practiced seriously. If a
bank experienced a significant run, the other banks in
the market area, generally operating in concert through
the local clearinghouse, would examine the banks fi-
nancial condition to determine whether it was suffer-
ing from a liquidity or a solvency problem. If it was
only a liquidity problem and the bank was economi-
cally solvent, the other banks would effectively recy-
cle the lost deposits back to the bank through loans
and interbank deposits. If it was a solvency problem,
the other banks would generally not recycle the de-
posits and permit the bank to fail.
After the Federal Reserve was established, bank
monitoring began to change from a private to a public
responsibility. The Feds initial lender of last resort
activity through the discount window was supplement-
ed in 1933 by the insurance of at least some bank de-
posits by the FDIC. As the ultimate guarantor of the
safety net, the government now had a direct financial
stake in the security of the protected institutions and
needed regulation to control its potential losses. As
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan (1999,
p. 10) has noted, the safety net requires that the gov-
ernment replace with law, regulation, and supervision
much of the disciplinary role that the market plays for
other businesses. The introduction of the safety net ef-
fectively also transferred the timing of the resolution of
insolvent banks from the market place, which had little
if any discretion, to the regulators, who had consider-
able discretion.
Because large units suffering adverse shocks are
perceived to be a greater threat to ignite more dam-
aging systemic risk and threaten the stability of the
financial system, governments have been particularly
concerned with protecting such units and their stake-
holders from serious harm. Such policies are popu-
larly referred to as too-big-to-fail, even though in
some countries, such as the U.S., the firms are gener-
ally permitted to fail. Rather, more accurately, such
institutions are too-big-to-liquidate or too-big to-
impose-losses on important stakeholders (Kaufman,
1990). Thus, in the U.S., the government may at
times extend the safety net below depositors and other
creditors at very large banks beyond the de jure non-
FDIC insured $100,000 per account coverage and
protect them against loss. More recently, however,
Chairman Greenspan (2000) has stated that he views
no institution as too big to either fail or liquidate (un-
wind) in an orderly fashion. What the authorities wish
to avoid is a quick (disorderly) reaction. But stockhold-
ers would not be protected and appropriate discounts or
haircuts would be imposed on nonguaranteed deposits.
Bernard and Bisignano (1999) make a convinc-
ing case that much of the large flows on the interna-
tional interbank market in more recent years at interest
rates that hardly discriminate among borrowers were
fueled by the belief that central banks would intervene
to prevent losses. There is also a perception that the
U.S. government might intervene in the threatened
insolvency of some large nondepository non-FDIC
insured financial institutions, such as insurance com-
panies, pension funds, finance companies, and hedge
funds, for example, as it was recently perceived to do
in Long-Term Capital Management. This is particu-
larly likely if banks are among the major creditors and
if the rapid unwinding of large and complex deriva-
tives positions may be feared to produce uncertainty
and large fire-sale losses. The safety net is not likely
to be stretched under smaller institutions of the same
type. In such interventions, the governments concern
is likely to be as much on limiting adverse spillover
to financial markets as to other institutions.
Ironically, regulators and governments frequently
encourage and even force banks to engage in risky
portfolio activities to further their economic, social,
or political goals in the form of credit allocation. In
the U.S., for example, until the thrift and banking
debacle of the 1980s, the government encouraged
and even forced federally chartered thrift institutions
to channel short-term deposits into long-term fixed-
rate residential mortgages. Such policies were possi-
ble only because of the simultaneous government
guarantees. Absent these guarantees, depositors would
have fled from institutions with such large risk expo-
sures and the institutions would have either failed
or changed their operating strategy. Indeed, before
deposit insurance in 1934, savings and loan associa-
tions made primarily only three- to five-year rollover
mortgages. Thus, they assumed relatively little interest
rate risk. Use of banks by governments to pursue
goals other than safety and efficiency increased the
vulnerability of the institutions and prolonged the
length and increased the cost of the recent banking
crises in the U.S., Mexico, Japan, and many more
countries (Kaufman, 1997a).20 Economic Perspectives
Because governments typically underprice the
guarantees and insurance that they provide, the insur-
ance and guarantees have encouraged depositors and
banks to engage in greater moral hazard behavior than
would be permitted by private insurers, whose primary
objective is minimizing losses to their shareholders.
The increased risk taking by banks in the form of
greater credit, interest rate, and foreign exchange rate
risk as well as lower capital ratios both increased the
likelihood of banking crises and the costs to solvent
banks and taxpayers. In addition, the agency problems
tend to be greater for government provided insurance
than for privately provided insurance. Evidence devel-
oped by Calomiris (1999) suggests that the magnitude
of both banking and currency crises has been greater
on average in the post-safety net era than before. As
a result, the costs of government policies to restrict
systemic risk frequently have exceeded the benefits,
although all the costs may not become widely visible
until long after any benefitsreduced runs and support-
ed asset valuesare enjoyed. Such guarantees appear
to be a classic example of the time inconsistency prob-
lem in economics. The benefits of the guarantees are
observed today and the costs only tomorrow. Given
that the public and policymakers generally apply high
discount rates to evaluating the present value of fu-
ture outcomes of policy actions, Kindleberger (1996, p.
149) appears often to be correct when he argues that
today wins over tomorrow.
More recently, public policy strategies to limit
systemic risk in banking have focused more on re-
stricting the safety net and attempting to have regula-
tory discipline resemble market discipline more closely.
These strategies would limit, if not eliminate, losses
from bank insolvency through more timely resolution
of economically floundering banks before their eco-
nomic or market value capital turns negative. Conta-
gious systemic risk can only transmit insolvencies if
the losses at each and every party on the transmission
chain exceed their capital. If banks are resolved before
their market value capital turns negative, systemic risk
transmitting losses is eliminated. These corrective
structures include measures such as prompt correc-
tive action and least cost resolution. In the U.S.,
they were enacted in varying and yet unknown de-
grees of effectiveness in the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991
(Benston and Kaufman, 1988, 1994, 1995, and 1998,
and Kaufman, 1997a and b).
Policies similar to those applied to banks have
been used to deal with currency crises. But, because
domestic governments cannot print the currencies of
other countries, large scale purchases of domestic
currency with foreign currency to maintain exchange
rates and the provision of guarantees of foreign curren-
cies effectively require the assistance of one or more
other countries or of multinational international orga-
nizations (Fischer, 1999). Through time, as with banks,
such support was first provided by private parties,
generally bankers, and then by foreign governments
(Bordo and Schwartz, 1998). Most recently, it has
been provided by official international institutions,
such as the IMF, World Bank, and regional develop-
ment banks. For example, in Mexico in 1994, the IMF
effectively guaranteed dollar-denominated Mexican
government securities and in 1997, all deposits, includ-
ing dollar-denominated deposits, at Indonesian, Korean,
and Thai banks (Lindgren et al., 1999). These policies
have been subjected to the same criticisms as have
been leveled at the similar bank policies (Meltzer,
1999). They increase moral hazard behavior by coun-
tries and private investors that in turn increases the
vulnerability of the international sector to future shocks.
In addition, the benefits of such support are likely to
accrue as much, if not more, to foreign creditors than
to domestic citizens, who have to repay the loans. For
example, Kho and Stulz (2000) find that the announce-
ment of the IMF guarantee program in Korea resulted
in large and statistically significant excess returns to
shareholders of large U.S., French, and German banks
that tended to have Korean exposures, as well as
shareholders of Korean banks. However, smaller and
insignificant excess returns were generally found in
response to the announcements of IMF support pro-
grams in the other East Asian countries. The largest
gains at U.S. banks were to those with the greatest
exposure to Korea. Lastly, international institutions
are just as likely to be unable to differentiate among
guilty and innocent parties and too often support
guilty parties.
Corrective policies, appropriate or inappropriate,
are more difficult for currency crises than banking cri-
ses for at least two reasons. One, countries are sover-
eign and it is difficult for other countries or international
organizations to impose enforceable conditions on
them without their cooperation and agreement. This
is evidenced by the frequent disregard of the IMFs
conditionality requirements by assisted countries or
the dumbing down of the conditionality features as
the assisted countries protest their perceived harshness.
Two, as noted, international organizations are not
central banks that can print unlimited quantities of
the currency of any country. They can only borrow
other countries currencies in limited quantities. Thus,
the assistance packages often include the worst of all
worlds. They may be too small to prevent a devaluation21 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
or mitigate most of its effects, but too large to avoid
moral hazard responses, increasing the likelihood
and costs of future crises.
Many of the more recent capital inflows into
developing countries appear to have been undertaken
on the perception of government or international
institution guarantees and would likely have been
significantly lower had such perceptions not existed.
But, even smaller capital flows from one or more
larger countries can swamp the economies of smaller
countries and cause substantial pressures on their ex-
change rates in rapidly changing directions that could
damage even well-managed countries (Little and
Olivei, 1999). Short-term international capital flows
to emerging economies are considerably more volatile
than long-term flows. This is evident from figure 2,
which shows bank loans, which are primarily short
term, and securities issuances, which are primarily
longer term, and from figure 3 for investments other
than long-term direct and portfolio. Indeed, direct
international investment has been relatively stable in
recent years. A large part of the decline in bank loans
was in the form of particularly short-term international
interbank loans (Bernard and Bisignano, 1999). As a
result, some propose restricting only bad short-term
capital inflows and not good long-term (portfolio
and direct) capital inflows (Council on Foreign Rela-
tions, 1999, and Wyplosz, 1999). However, as argued
earlier, this may increase risk taking by private and
government debtors by reducing the ex ante threat of
foreign investors disciplining them on a timely basis
by withdrawing their funds. (Some critics go even
further and question the benefit of permitting any
international capital flows on an unregulated basis;
for example, Bhagwati, 1998. Edwards, 1999, provides
a counter argument.)
In summary, a number of difficulties plague the use
of government policies to prevent or mitigate perceived
systemic risk in either banking or balance of payments
without introducing counterproductive and harmful
longer-term effects. These include problems in:
n Differentiating innocent (economically sound)
parties or sectors that require only temporary liquidi-
ty assistance from guilty (economically unsound)
parties or sectors that require longer-term support
that if provided could often fail to lead to recovery
and could delay adjustment, result in substantial
misallocations of resources, and increase losses in
the longer run. While governments and bank regu-
lators may have more timely and superior informa-
tion about troubled banks in emerging economies,
this is less likely in industrial countries. Thus, at
least in industrial countries with well-developed
money and capital markets, it is likely to be more
efficient to provide liquidity assistance indirectly
through open market operations and let the market
allocate the funds to perceived solvent parties than
to attempt to do so directly to the government-
perceived solvent banks through the central banks
discount window or otherwise (Kaufman, 1991,
and Capie, 1998). This would also ease the pricing
problem noted below.
n Determining the correct amount of any assistance
to be provided. Too little would not solve the prob-
lem and be wasted and too much would misallocate
resources and create the potential for moral hazard
problems that could exacerbate the problem.
n Determining the correct price of the assistance to
discourage excessive moral hazard behavior on
the part of the recipients.
n Avoiding political considerations and interference
(forbearing), so that the assistance is provided
where needed on the basis of economic consider-
ations only.
n Implementing necessary actions that could harm
powerful political groups or government allies,
such as requiring banks to officially declare loans
in default as nonperforming. These actions would
cause the borrowers to be declared legally bankrupt,
reducing the market prices of their shares and pos-
sibly ousting their management.
n Discouraging the adoption of simple and intuitively
appealing but ineffective policies, such as restoration
of banking or currency controls, that, although
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they were inefficient and ultimately motivated the
deregulation, concealed the problem for some time
(time inconsistent solutions).
n Introducing fundamental structural legal reforms
that are necessary for market discipline to be effec-
tive, such as enforceable contracts, property rights,
bankruptcy laws, and a credible court system.
(For a description of the importance of the legal
system in finance, see Laporta et al., 1998.)
Long-term solutions
The most feasible long-run solutions to systemic
risk in both banking and exchange rates lie with in-
creased reliance on market forces and market discipline.
(A wide rage of potential solutions is discussed in
Bisignano et al., 2000.) But this does not imply either
that there will not be failuresindeed these are likely
to be relatively frequent but small crisesor that there
is no role for government policies. Government policies
may be required to improve the effectiveness of market
discipline, particularly if other government policies
have weakened the incentives for such discipline.
The evidence from recent currency crises clearly
highlights the key role of government protected eco-
nomically insolvent banks in fostering the underlying
economic conditions that precipitated the speculative
runs and eventual depreciation of the currencies by
financing unsustainable increases in real estate and
stock market prices (Adams et al., 1998, BIS, 1997
and 1998, and IMF, 1998a and b). For example, al-
though varying widely among countries, bank credit
extended to the private sector expanded greatly in the
four major East Asian countriesIndonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, and Thailandin the years leading up to
the crises. In Malaysia, the ratio of private sector bank
credit to GDP doubled from 71 percent to 142 percent
between 1990 and 1996, the year before the crisis,
and in Thailand, the ratio increased by 67 percent
between 1990 and 1995 (World Bank, 1998). Much
of this credit went to real estate, which is traditional-
ly viewed as risky. Each of the four countries had
such loans in excess of 20 percent of total bank
loans, a level considered vulnerable by the IMF
(Lindgren et al., 1999). These loans helped push up
real estate prices sharply and, when these prices
dropped abruptly, went into default and contributed
significantly to the severity of the crises.
The banks were able to grow their risky loans this
rapidly in part because they were not fully exposed to
market discipline until the domestic governments
explicit or implicit guarantees lost their credibility.
By that time, it was too late. In addition, state-owned
and -controlled banks are rarely subject to market
discipline and, as effectively arms of government
policy in allocating credit to targeted sectors or al-
lies, are notorious for badly misallocating credit
(Kaufman, 1999). The banking problems in transi-
tional economies are attributable largely to loans to
insolvent state-owned or -controlled and, recently, to
poorly privatized enterprises and, at least in Russia,
also to finance securities and foreign exchange spec-
ulation. To properly understand the operation and im-
plications of these banks, their balance sheets should
be combined with those of their government, rather
than viewed separately.
To enhance the role of market discipline for larger
banks in an environment of partial government guar-
antees, they should be required to issue a minimum
percentage of term debt of a relatively short maximum
maturity that is subordinated to the governments
claim. Similar to the bank insurance agencies, these
claimants have only limited upside potential relative
to their downside risk and, because they cannot run,
may reasonably be expected to monitor their banks
carefully. This would supplement monitoring and dis-
cipline by both shareholders and regulators (Benston
and Kaufman, 1998, Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System, 1999, Evanoff and Wall, 2000,
and U.S. Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee,
2000). The interest rate the market demands on such
explicitly uninsured debt sends a highly visible signal
to the market of the issuing banks perceived financial
condition and makes it harder for the regulators to
delay imposing sanctions required under prompt
corrective action.
In addition, most governments can greatly upgrade
the quality, prestige, and independence of their bank
supervisors (Caprio, 1998, and Bisignano et al., 2000).
Supervisors must be able to understand the nature
and consequences of bank activities and have the
respect and authority of the bankers in order for their
reports and recommendations to have credibility and
be evaluated seriously. This also requires that they be
adequately compensated relative to the bankers that
they supervise.
Moreover, in some countries, the government
guarantees are perceived to extend beyond banks and
other financial institutions to other major firms. Thus,
corporate leverage ratios in general are at levels vastly
inconsistent with the degree of macro instability in
the economy. In Korea and Thailand, for example,
the debt to equity ratios are four to five times the lev-
els in the U.S. and much of Western Europe (figure
4) and are possible only because of the perceived
guarantees. It does not take much of an adverse shock,
at times only a slowdown in growth rates or small23 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
increases in interest rates, to drive these firms into
insolvency. If the government protects shareholders
as well as debtholders, little if any market discipline
will exist. These countries require the introduction or
intensification of an equity culture, in which losses
as well as profits are privatized, rather than profits
privatized and losses socialized. Market discipline
implies a system of rewards (carrots) and punishment
(sticks). Without sticks, market discipline is ineffec-
tive. Many countries need to put the discipline mean-
ingfully into market discipline. It is of interest to
note that the sharpest rebound in gross capital in-
flows to emerging Asian economies in 1999 occurred
in equity financing. The inflow exceeded even pre-
crisis levels and suggests that, for the moment anyway,
foreign investors prefer less leverage (IMF, 2000).
Lastly and perhaps most importantly, governments
can reduce the likelihood of systemic risk and crises
in both banking and exchange rates by pursuing stabi-
lizing macroeconomic policies that reduce the frequen-
cy and magnitude of adverse shocks. This is easiest
for larger diversified industrial countries and most
difficult for smaller, open, undiversified, developing
countries. The less able a government is to stabilize
its economy, the more it must require its banks to be
protected by capital and its exchange rate
to be protected by foreign reserves or be
prepared to permit the rate to float.
The above structural and political
reforms are often not easy to introduce.
Important and powerful sectors and par-
ties, for example, risky real estate and
corporate borrowers and their allies, ben-
efited from the existing arrangements,
even if the economy as a whole may not
have, and are understandably reluctant to
surrender this advantage. Otherwise, the
reforms would already have been intro-
duced. Evidence from past banking and
currency crises suggests that major re-
forms (for good or bad) are generally
easier to introduce the more severe the
crisis and the more discredited the old
policies and the more visible their costs.
Thus, mild crises rarely lead to funda-
mental and lasting reforms. It took the
severe banking and thrift crisis in the U.S.
in the 1980s to enact the reform FDICIA
legislation that reduced the discretionary
power of the regulators and the severe
currency crises in Korea and Thailand in
the late 1990s to begin to reduce heavy
government intervention in large domes-
tic financial and nonfinancial firms.
Conclusion
Costly banking and currency crises have plagued
most countries in recent years, significantly reducing
their GDP and causing sizable transfer payments
among domestic sectors. Thus, these crises are of
concern to both monetary and bank regulatory policy-
makers. Considerable time and efforts are being
devoted to identifying the causes of these twin crises
and developing solutions to reduce both the probability
of their occurrence in the future and their severity if and
when they do occur. Banking and currency crises have
a number of common characteristics and are frequently
interconnected, so that one may ignite the other.
Because the banking and currency sectors are
widely perceived to be fragile, government guaran-
tees are often introduced that protect at least some
claim holders from loss. But the guarantees or safety-
nets were often poorly designed. As a result, they fre-
quently increased rather than decreased the relative
fragility of these sectors, so that subsequent break-
downs were frequently more serious and costly. At least
part of the cost was shifted from the claim holders
directly affected to the insurance agency or govern-
ment, so that the cost was less visible. In addition,
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many countries in recent years introduced programs of
financial deregulation and liberalization to both in-
crease the influence of market forces and encourage
greater efficiency and economic development. Unfor-
tunately, these changes were often introduced before
the underpinnings that permit market forces to oper-
ate efficiently and successfully were fully in place.
In the absence of either effective market or effective
regulatory discipline, breakdowns increased in fre-
quency and magnitude.
This article argues that lasting solutions to these
crises need both to avoid the difficulties from poor
implementation and to be incentive compatible, so
that policymakers do the right thing. With respect
to banks, adverse moral hazard and principalagent
problems associated with government guarantees may
be reduced by limiting the guarantees so as to intro-
duce at least partial market discipline and by designing
a structure of regulatory discipline that both mimics
market discipline and offsets any declines in market
discipline that the regulation itself may introduce.
Ironically, however, limiting government-provided
guarantees to increase emphasis on market discipline
requires that governments significantly upgrade the
quality, prestige, and independence of their bank su-
pervisors both to monitor the condition of the banking
system and to implement appropriate sanctions on
troubled institutions on a timely and effective basis
to turn the institutions around before they reach in-
solvency. A system of regulatory prompt corrective
action with sanctions that become progressively
harsher and more mandatory as a banks financial
position deteriorates and least cost resolution based
on the provisions included in FDICIA in the U.S.
could serve as an anchor. To improve market discipline,
it is also necessary in some countries to establish or
strengthen an equity culture in which losses as well
as profits are privatized. This requires putting in place
the legal, cultural, social, and political structures
that permit markets and market discipline to operate
effectively.
Similarly for currency or exchange rate problems,
guarantees by either the domestic government or
official international organizations that eliminate en-
tirely or even significantly reduce potential losses to
creditors if the domestic currency is depreciated have
eventually contributed to deprecations and their asso-
ciated problems as often as they have prevented them.
To reduce the likelihood of exchange rate breakdowns,
increased emphasis must both be transferred to mar-
ket forces to discipline wrongdoers and be placed on
stabilizing macroeconomic policies to reduce the
need for guarantees that delay and disguise the adverse
implications of poor policies.
Lastly, systemic risk for both banking and ex-
change rates appears to be more serious in perception
than in reality. The historical evidence suggests that
direct causation (chain reaction) contagion rarely if
ever occurs. Common shock contagion occurs more
frequently, but primarily on a rational, information-
based basis. Banks and countries with similar risk ex-
posure to those of the bank or country experiencing
the initial adverse shock will also be adversely affected.
But to the extent that neither information nor process-
ing of information is free or immediate, innocent
banks or countries may be adversely impacted tempo-
rarily during the sorting out period. However, the
effect is rarely sufficiently strong to drive innocent
banks into insolvency or depreciate innocent coun-
ties currencies permanently. Rather than providing
full guarantees and safety nets, the public interest
would be better served if public policy were directed
at reducing both the time required for market partici-
pants to sort out the innocent from the guilty parties
and the costs of doing so. This may be achieved by im-
proving the timely and accurate disclosure of rele-
vant information, including that provided by the
governments themselves.
1The Benelux countries consist of Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Luxembourg.
2More recent estimates by the IMF place the cumulative four-
year total output loss (the sum of losses from both currency and
banking crises) of the Tequila crisis in the mid-1990s at 30 per-
cent for Mexico and 15 percent for Argentina and of the East
Asia crisis of the late 1990s at 82 percent for Indonesia, 57 per-
cent for Thailand, 39 percent for Malaysia, and 27 percent for
Korea (IMF, 1999b). In addition, recent estimates place the decline
in real GDP from peak to trough in the crises countries in these
years at 10 percent for Mexico, 19 percent for Indonesia, 14 per-
cent for Thailand, 8 percent for Korea, and 4 percent for Russia
(Summers, 2000).
3Estimates of the transfer payments generally have a wide range
of error and, until all insolvent institutions in the country are
completely resolved, can vary greatly from observation date to
observation date. The estimates are more or less equal to the ag-
gregate negative net worth of the protected economically insol-
vent institutions. Because this amount is partially determined by
the actual proceeds from the sale of the institutions assets since
insolvency and the projected proceeds from future sales and re-
coveries, it is highly sensitive to the state of the economy and
the level of interest (discount) rates on the observation date. The
poorer the state of the economy on this date, the smaller will be
the projected proceeds from asset sales and the larger the necessary
transfer payments. Conversely, the better the state of the economy,25 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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